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Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 47 
1. '.i'he Facts 
The estate of Mr C.W. Phipp s, father of the appel
lant, 
'1'or.1 Piiipps, and the respondent, included 8,000 sh
ares in 
Leste r & Harris Ltd., a Company engaged in the t
extile 
business. Mr Phipps' estate also included a subs
tantial 
holding in a family company, Phipps & Son Ltd., a
lso 
engaged in the textile business. Tom Phipps was 
chairman of 
this company and Mr Boardman was one of its dire
ctors. 
In his will, Mr C.W. Phipps left an annuity to hi
s widow. 
Subject thereto each of his three sons was to rec
eive 5/18ths 
of his estate with the remaining 3/ 18ths going to
 his daughter, 
Mrs iJoble. (These proportions were not altere
d by the 
testators eldest son predeceasing him - his 5/ 18t
hs going 
to his widow and. famil y .) The three trustees of 
the will 
were Mrs i~oble, an accountant named Mr Fox, and u
p until 
her cieath in Novewber, 1958, the testators widow, 
Mrs 
I:.thel Phipps. However because of .her age ( she wa
s over 8 0 
ancl suffering from senility when the events relev
ant to this 
case occurred) ti1e last mentioned took no active 
part in the 
affairs of the trust. 
In December, 1955 Mr Boardman, who acted as solic
itor 
to the trust as well as several members of the Ph
ipps famil y , 
received a letter from a third party asking wheth
er the 
trustees were prepared to sell their holding in 
Lester & 
Harris Ltd. Subsequent investigation of that 
Company 's 
accounts by Loth he ancl Mr Fox showe d the asset v
alue of 
t he 30,000 ordinary ;el shar e s to b e a ppr ox imatel y 
~10 a 
s i1a r e . On Decembe r 17, 1 956 , Mr Boar dma n wr o t e to
 Mrs Noble 
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informing her of this fact and of the low yield returned 
by the shares, stating that they all felt something shou
ld 
be done to improve the position. Tom Phipps had suggeste
d 
that he and Boardman should attend the Annual General M
eeting 
of Lester & Harris Ltd. and towards this end Boardman 
enclosed a proxy form to be signed by Mrs Noble and her m
other. 
Their attendance at this meeting as representatives of 
the trust holding was unfruitful. They failed in a bid t
o get 
Tom Phipps elected director, and could gain little inform
ation 
of any significance over and above that published in the 
accounts. 
In the course of reporting this to Mr Fox, Boardman sugge
sted 
that the only way in which the matter could be satisfact
orily 
resolved would be by purchasing a controlling interest 
in Lester & Harris Ltd. Fox replied that he did not 
consider that a takeover bid for shares in a private comp
any 
was something that he, as a trustee, or the trust, should
take 
any part in, later stating in evidence that he would not 
have considered the trustees buying those shares under an
y 
circumstances. In order to buy the shares, the trust wou
ld 
have required the approval of the court, and as noted by 
Lord Dilhorne, 
" .•.•• whether the court would have sanctioned this 
speculation at a time wh en on the d ea t h of his widow, 
then in failing hea l th, the estate would have become 
divisible among the beneficiaries of his will, and 
when the proposed investment was in a private company 
which was not doing well, and the trust had no money (l)
 
available for investment, may well be open to doubt" -
In any event, on Fox's refusal Boardman then suggested 
that the appellant Phipps should try to buy the shares, a
nd 
( 1) Boar dman v Phipp s [19 6 7] 2 AC 47 @ 7 6 
• 
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when Phipps refused unless Boardman would go in with him, 
Boardman agreed to do so. After an initial attempt to buy 
the share privately had failed, Boardman contacted Fox, 
saying that they proposed to make an offer to buy the 
shares personally by circular. He pointed out that this 
would not involve the trustees, who would share in any 
advantage gained, and asked Fox to confirm that the circular 
was in order with regard to both his and Tom Phipps' 
~ositions vis-a-vis the trust. 
Fox raised no objection, but suggested that they write 
to Mrs Noble. This was done, Boardman stating inter alia 
"the making of an offer in this form is not a 
matter which Trustees should properly do, and Tom and 
I have, therefore, agreed to make an offer personally" _(
2 ) 
So with her assent as well, an advance copy of the circular 
was sent to Lester & Harris Ltd., indicating that the offer 
was made by the appellants, and at the same time stating 
that they were instructed to ask on behalf of the executors 
of Mr C.W. Phipps for a list of the members of the Company 
and their addresses. (This information was needed in order 
that the appellants could distribute them effectively.) 
The Directors of Lester & Harris Ltd. advised their 
shareholders not to sell, whereupon the appellants raised 
their original offer of t2.5.0. a share to t3, conditional 
upon acceptance by the holders of not less than 7,500 shares. 
Only 2925 shares were forwarded, and despite the fact that the 
offer was later declared unconditional and the shares 
appropriated by the appellants, this was not until 1959, and 
so for the moment that plan too was ineffectua l. 
( 2) ibid p. 7 8 
• 
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Undeterred the appellants wrote to Mr Smith, c
hairman 
of the Company suggesting that a possible solu
tion might be 
to divide the Lester & Harris Ltd group so tha
t the Harris 
family and directors owned the whole of one pa
rt, and the 
Phipps interests owned the balance. Mr Smith 
and his 
associates seemed to support in principle this
 suggestion 
and henceforth until October 1958, negotiation
s were 
continued with a view to finding an acceptable
 basis for 
splitting the Company. The most notable feat
ure of these 
negotiations was that the appellants represent
ed to Mr Smith 
that they were acting on behalf of the trust. 
Then in October, 1958 Mr Smith suggested tha
t they 
make an offer for the whole of the remaining s
hare capital. 
Subsequently on March 10, 1959 an agreement wa
s made between 
Mr Smiti1 and the appellants for the sale of t
heir sahres 
in Lester & Harris Ltd. for t4/10/- a share. 
On the same day 
Boardman wrote to the respondent, Mrs Noble a
nd Mrs F.M. 
Phipps (the widow of the dead son) telling the
m of the situation. 
That letter was the first corrununication Boardm
an had had with 
the respondent in relation to this matter of t
he trust holding 
of 8,000 shares. The respondent knew nothing 
about the 
intentions of trustees or Boardman in relation
 to these shares 
or of any negotiations which had taken place. 
Boardman then sold all the Australian interest
s of the 
Company, and later their Coventry factory, tra
nsactions vhich 
resulted in capital distributions of ~3 and B2
/17/6 a share 
respectively. At this stage Tom Phipps teleph
oned the 
< 
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respondent and offered him t2 per share for his proportionate 
holding in the trust shares. The respondent co
nsulted his 
solicitor and as a result issued a warrant clai
ming, firstly that 
the appellants held 5/18ths of their ordinary t
l shares in the 
company as constructive trustees for the respon
dent, secondly, 
an account of the profits made by them from thi
s holdings, 
and thirdly an order that they should transfer 
to the respondent 
the shares which they held as constructive trus
tees for him, 
as well as 5/18ths of the profit from the whole
 venture. 
2. Their Lordships Decisions 
( 3) 
At the Court of first instance Wilberforce 
J found 
the two defendants liable as constructive trus
tees, holding 
that the knowledge they acquired of the affairs
 of Lester & 
Harris Ltd was in the circumstances trust prop
erty, and that 
the acts which brought about the profit were ac
ts within the 
scope of their agency for the trust, and theref
ore in breach 
of their fiduciary duty to the same. On Appea
l, the Court 
of Appeal (Lord Denning, M.R., Pearson and Rus
sell L.J.J.) 
unanimously upheld the verdict of Wilberforce J
. (4 ) 
\J:'I I.,,.., 
In the further appeal to the House of Lords, Jo
hn 
Phipps based his case on three grounds. He all
eged Boardman 
(and therefore Tom Phipps, who requested to be 
treated in an 
identical manner) to be accountable as construc
tive trustee 
for one or all of the following reasons. 
(a) That he made a profit by using trust p
roperty 
(information which belonged to the trust). 
(b) That he had made a prof it by way of hi
s fiduciar y 
position. 
(3) Phipps v Boardman (1964] 2 All ER 187
 
All ER 849 ( 4) B:)ardman v Phipps (1965] 
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(c) That a conflict had existed between the 
respondents duty to the trust and his personal 
interest. 
(a) Use of Trust Property 
Any discussion or evaluation of their Lordships reasoning 
on this ground necessarily involves lengthy arguments which 
are substantially tangential to the aims of this paper. The 
instancing of those situations in which confidential information 
should be categorised as equitable property is of little import 
when one is attempting to answer the more general question 
as to what type of duties or standards should be imposed upon 
a fiduciary when dealing with a trust or trust assets and to 
this end it is proposed to deal only with the remaining 
two grounds outlined above. Suffice to say that Lord Upjohn and 
Viscount Dilhorne dissenting the majority held that the 
information and knowledge gained by the appellants was trust 
property because it came to them whilst they were acting in 
a fiduciary capacity. (S) Liability, therefore, did attach 
to the appellants under this ground. 
(b) Profit Made By Way Of Fiduciary Position 
All five of the Law Lords accepted that the appelants 
were in a fiduciary position with regard to the trust, although 
(5) Lord Cohen was not prepared to state that this would 
always be the case, but held in light of the existing 
circumstances that such a conclusion was warranted 
in this instance. Boardman v Phipps (supra) at p 103 
-
• 
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the exact nature of this relationship is never agreed upon. 
Viscount Dilhorne forwarded perhaps the most attractive 
description. 
" .••. that relationship arose from their being employed 
as agents of the trust on the occasions I have mentioned. 
[The authorised representation of the trust at the two 
general meetings, Boardman as trust solicitor dealing 
with the inquiry as to whether the trust would sell 
their holding, and Boardman, as solicitor, and Phipps 
discussing with Mr Fox in December 1956 the accounts 
of Lester & Harris Ltd. and what should be done to 
improve the value of the trust holding] and continued 
throughout" ( 6) 
Yet Lord Cohen would have them not as general agents, 
but "agents for limited purposes".(?) 
And Lord Guest would go no further than saying 
"the defendants placed themselves in a special position 
which was of a fiduciary character." (8) 
Despite this initial uncertainty, having found that a 
fudiciary relationship did exist the majority (Lords Hodson, 
Guest and Cohen) showed no hesitancy in holding the 
respondents liable. 
and 
( 6) 
( 7) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
( 10) 
"The knowledge and information obtained by Boardman 
was obtained in the course of the fiduciary position in 
which he placed himself. The only defence available 
to a person in such a fiduciary position is that the 
made the profit with the knowledge and assent of the 
trustees. It is not contended that the trustees had 
such knowledge or gave such consent." (9) 
" whether or not the trust or the beneficiaries in 
their stead could have taken advantage of the information 
is immaterial as the authorities clearly show" (10) 
Boardman V Phi}2}2S supra at p.88 
ibid at 103 
ibid at 118 
Boardman V Phi}2}2S 
ibid per Lord Hodson at p.11 
< • 
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In reaching the opposite conclusion, Viscount Dilhorne 
relied heavily on the words of Lord Russell in the similar 
case of Regal Hastings Ltd v Gulliver. (ll) In the case 
the ~rofit arose through the application by four of the 
directors of the appellant Company for shares in a subsidary 
company which the Board had intended should be subscribed 
for by the company itself. Lord Russell held that the 
directors had acquired the shares 
" by reason, and only by reason of the fact that 
they were directors of Regal, and in the course of 
their execution of that office" (12) 
Viscount Dilhorne was of the view that the shares obtained 
by the appellants in this instance were not acquired only by 
use of their fiduciary position, or by reason and only by 
reason of the fact that they were agents of the trust for 
certain limited purposes. Because of this, the liability 
which attached to the directors in Regal, would not, in his 
view, be attached here to Boardman and Tom Phipps. 
Lord Upjohn, who also dissented, went further than this, 
disagreeing with the basic premise of the majority. 
"Knowledge learned by a trustee in the course of his 
duties is not in the least property of the trust and 
in general may be used by him for his own benefit 
or for the benefit of other trusts unless it is 
confidential information which is given to him (a) 
in circumstances which regardless of his posi~ion 
as a trustee would make it a breach of confidence 
for him to communicate to anyone for it has been given 
to him expressly or impliedly as confidential information 
or (b) in a fiduciary capacity and its use would place 
him in a position where his duty and his interest might 
possibly conflict." ( 13) 
(11) [1967] 2 A.C. 134 
(12) Regal Hastings (supra) at p.186 
(13) Boardman v Phipps (supra) at p.128 
• 
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This by a three to two majority the appellants were 
held to be constructive trustees for a profit made by way 
of their fiduciary position. 
(c) Conflict Between Duty and Interest 
On this third issue liability was also attached to the 
appellants and by a similar margin. All five Lords agreed to 
the extent that if the appellants could be seen to have 
entered into engagements in which they had or could have 
had a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may 
have conflicted with the interests of those whom they were 
bound to protect, then they were liable. Unfortunately they 
differed as to the degree to which the test should be applied. 
Lord Upjohn saw "possibly may conflict" as meaning that -
"A reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and 
circumstances of the particular case would think that 
there was a real sensible possibility of conflict -
not that you would imagine some situation arising which 
might in some conceivable events not contemplated as 
real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, 
result in conflict. (14) 
He supported Viscount Dilhorne's finding in the case. 
"There was no possibility, so long as Mr Fox was 
opposed to the trust buying any of the shares, of any 
conflict of interest arising through the purchase of 
the shares by the appellants." (15) 
The majority on the other hand were more demanding. 
"No doubt it was but a remote possibility that Mr 
Boardman would ever be asked by the trustees to advise 
on the desirability of an application to the court in 
order that the trustees might avail themselves of the 
information obtained. Nevertheless, even if the possibility 
of conflict is present between personal interest and 
the fiduciary position, the rule of equality must be 
applied" (16) 
(14) ibid at p 124 
(15) ibid at p 88 
(16) Boardman v Phipps (supra) at p 111 
• 
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The existence of a remote possibility was held 
sufficient, therefore, to warrant the court upholding the 
respondents claim on this ground. 
3. The Basis of the Rule 
At its strictest, the effect of this decision is that 
a fiduciary will be held accountable as a constructive 
trustee for any profit he makes arising out of his position 
as trustee, or whenever a possible conflict (no matter how 
remote) exists between his duty to the trust and his personal 
interest. That the trust has suffered no loss, (it may 
as in the present case have actually gained substantially) 
is irrelevant to the operation of the rule. The fact that 
the fiduciary has acted with complete honesty, or that he 
risked his own time and m~n~ to gain that profit, is similarly 
ineffectual. 
What then is the basis for such a doctrine? Why has the 
court here persisted with a principle recognised by other 
courts as one which in many situations can inflict inequities 
and hardship? Rules of inequity were evolved for the purpose 
of mitigating the harshness of the common law. Is it then 
folly for the House of Lords to entrench such an effect when 
they could have guessed the chance to introduce a more flexibl e 
ruling in line with modern practices in this area? 
Keech v Sandford 
this steadfast rule. 
(17) 
(17) (1726) Sel Cas.ch. 61 
is the leading case dealing with 
--1 :c: 
0 
,a 
-0 -
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"no man who stands in a position of trust towards 
another can in matters affected by that position, advanc
e 
his own interests at that others expense" (18) 
There the defendant was a trustee for an infant of a ren
ewable 
lease. Upon being informed by the landlord that he was 
not 
prepared to renew the lease to the infant, the defendant
 
took a new lease for himself. He was subsequently compe
lled 
by the court to hold the renewed lease on the terms of t
he 
trust. Reasons of policy, as in modern day decisions, 
were even then very much to the fore. 
"This may seem hard, that the trustee is the only 
person of all mankind who might not have the lease 
but it is very proper that rule should be strictly 
persued and not in the least relaxed, for it is 
very obvious what would be the consequences of letting 
trustees have the lease on refusal to renew the 
cestui que use" (19) 
Later courts were prepared to extend this rule from expr
ess 
trusts to cover other situations, the requirement being 
that 
the particular claiment could prove a fiduciary relations
hip 
between himself and the person who had allegedly taken 
advantage of him. 
"Such a fiduciary relationship gives rise to the 
placing of trust and confidence by the claimant in 
the fiduciary, and equity would impose express trust 
obligations upon the fiduciary who abused that 
trust and confidence." (20) 
Thus the fiduciary became and was described as a constru
ctive 
trustee. 
In conjunction with its widening, the courts took, and 
have continued to take, pains to emphasis the inexorable
 nature 
of this principle. 
(18) Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd [1
921] A.O. 
168 at 171 
(19) Keech v Sandford (supra) per Lord Chancellor King 
(20) D.W.M. Waters "The Law of Trusts in Canada" p.343 
--1 :a: 
0 
,c, 
-0 -
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" tradition that is unbending and inverterate. 
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of co
urts 
of equity when petitioned to undetermine the rule 
of undivided loyalty by the disintegrating erosion 
of particular exceptions ••. only thus has the leve
l 
of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level hig
her 
than that trodden by the crowd" (21) 
"that rule is an inflexible rule and must be applie
d 
inexorably by this court which is not entitled, in 
my 
judgement, to receive evidence or suggestion or 
argument as to whether the principal did or did not
 
suffer any injury in fact by reason of the dealing 
of 
the agent." (22) 
Faced with over 200 years of such staunch and unben
ding 
precedent, the House of Lords, by the narrowest ma
rgin possible, 
chose to follow in the footsteps of their predecess
ors. The 
question to be asked, therefore, is was this decisi
on the 
result of ultra-conservatism so often attributed to
 the judiciary, 
a body too afraid to question a doctrine of such lo
ng standing 
and out of touch with the practicalities of modernd
ay trust 
work? Or can in fact a reasoned line of thought be
 found 
to lie behind the reinforcement of such a strict do
ctrine? 
4. The Validity of the Rule 
The approach taken by the court in reaffirming the 
old rule is, as stated by Gareth Jones (
23 ) clearly a 
prophylactic one. And put bluntly it is a rule of 
simplistic 
certainty. viz. 
(21) Meinhard v Salmon 249 N.Y. 456 at 464 
(22) Parker v McKenna (1874) L.R. 10 Ch 96 at 124 
(23) "Unjust Enrichment and the fiduciaries duty of
 loyalty" 84 
L.Q.R. 472. 
< • 
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"[Liability] in no way depends on fraud or on 
absence of bona fides. The liability arises from the 
mere fact of a profit having, in the stated circumstances 
been made. " ( 2 4) 
Yet its rigid application, it is said, has been and will 
continue to be the source of unjust hardship. Why then is 
it peristed with, especially in view of the efforts to mitigate 
rules of similar effect in other areas of the law? 
Areas of the law where a strict approach has been modified 
Prior to the case of Holder v Holder (
2 S)it had been a 
steadfast fule of equity for 200 years, (
26 ) that a trustee was 
debarred from purchasing trust property. 
"the purchase is not permitted in 
however honest the circumstances; 
interests of justice requiring it 
every instance" (27) 
any case, 
the general 
to be destroyed in 
The defendant in the case was one of three executors 
named in his fathers estate. On informing the other two that 
he wanted to buy two farms forming part of the estate, the 
defendant was advised that he should cease acting as executor. 
He purported to renounce, having taken no part in the administration 
of the estate apart from signing four cheques and some insurance 
documents. The farms were subsequently sold at public auction 
and bought by the defendant. 
The defendant conceeded, erronously in the eyes of the 
Appellate Court, that the renunciation was ineffective. However, 
even assuming the defendant still to have been an executor, 
the court held against the plaintiff on the ground that he 
had acquiesed in the sale, and that in the circumstances of 
(24) Regal Hastings (supra) per Lord Russell at 156 
( 2 5) [ 19 6 8] Ch 3 5 3 
(26) Since exparte James (1808) 8 Ves. 337 
(27) exparte James (supra) at p 344 
14. 
the case the rule against a trustee buying the trust estate 
ought not to be applied. 
Harmen L.J. acknowledged that the defendant, by remaining 
an executor, came within the scope of the rule, but not it 
would seem within its intent. 
''a case where the reasons behind the rule do not exist"(
28 ) 
In other words he looked to these reasons (that a man may not be 
both vendor and purchaser, and that there must never be a 
conflict of duty and interest), and held that because these 
situations did not exist, because the beneficiaries never 
looked to the defendant to protect their interests, he could 
not be prevented from purchasing the property. 
The law of partnership has witnessed a similar divergence. 
A partner has always been held accountable to his firm for any 
benefit derived by him, without the consent of the other 
partners, from any transaction concerning the partnership, or 
from any use by him of the partnership property, name or 
business connections. Yet in Aas v Benham (
29 ) the Court of 
Appeal held that a partner who made use of information obtained 
by him as a member of the firm did not have to account for 
any benefit he may have derived from such information, 
because it was used for purposes which were wholly without 
the scope of the firm business. 
"It is not the source of the information, but the use to 
which it is applied which is important in such matters" (30) 
(28) Holder v Holder (supra) at p 365 
(29) [1891] 2 Ch 244 
(30) Aas v Benham (supra) at 262 
• 
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Thus the case became another instance where the court refused 
to apply carte-blanche a broad principle to a situation 
which although applicable on its facts was not within the 
purpose of the rule. 
Extending the logic behind these exceptions to the 
present case, those in favour of a relaxing of the rule assert 
that it was open to the court, as was done by Viscount 
Dilhorne, to find that because the trust could not have used 
the information to acquire the shares, (i.e. such a venture 
was outside the scope of the trust business), there could be 
no conflict of duty and interest, and therefore the appellants 
could not be liable for any subsequent use they put it to. 
In fact a recent Canadian court was prepared to do just 
that. (3 l) The Board of Directors of a mining promotion 
company had considered, and in the eyes of the court, bona 
fides rejected an offer of a new venture made to the company by an 
outsider, on the grounds that it was not an investment which 
the company ought to have made. Individual directors, the 
defendant among them, then chose to contact the outsider and 
put up their own money for the speculation. 
They were held by the court not to have violated any 
duty to the company, nor to have profited by reason of and 
in the course of their fiduciary position in the Company. This 
despite the fact that the new acquisitions were mining claims 
neighbouring the company's holdings, and were purchased by the 
individual directors upon the advice of the company's geologist. 
(31) Peso Silver Mines N.P.L. Ltd. v Cropper (1966) 58 DLR 1 
16. 
In so holding, Cartwright J. relied completely
 on the 
fact that the circumstances in Peso were iden
tical to a 
hypothetical considered by Lord Greere in Regal
 Hastings. 
"When a Board of Directors considers an invest
ment 
which is offered to their company and bona £id
es comes to 
the conclusion that it is not an investment w
hich their 
company ought to make, any director after that
 resolution 
is come to and bona £ides comes to who chooses
 to put 
up the money for that investment himself must 
be treated 
as having done it on behalf of the company, so
 that the 
company can claim any profit that results to h
im from 
it" (32) 
Lord Greene emphatically rejected such a conc
lusion. 
" ••• far beyond anything that has ever been su
ggested 
as to the duty of the directors, agents or per
sons 
in a position of that kind." (33) 
This case was decided contemporaneously with B
oardman 
v Phipps and consequently neither case was ref
erred to by 
the other. Reference is made in Peso, howeve
r, to Lord 
Dennings Court of Appeal decision in which he 
approved the 
above hypothetical of Lord Greene's. (
34 ) 
How is it that Lord Denning supports Lord Gre
ene's example 
and yet still find Boardman liable. Is there 
an inherent difference 
between the duties of a director of a company 
and those of an 
agent to his principal? Or does there exist i
n Boardman's case 
some circumstance which takes it outside the h
ypothetical and 
justifies the use of the stricter approach? 
At the least then, decisions and exceptions su
ch as these 
show that an argument can be made for the intr
oduction of a 
burden of proof test to replace the absolute r
ule at present in 
force. Yet before comparing the relative mer
its of the 'flexible' 
and 'absolute' approaches, there is a third ap
proach forwarded by 
a number of writers (
35 )to solve the problem of the injustices 
said to occur under the present system which d
eserves attention. 
(33) ibid at p.9 
(34) ibid 
(35) See Goff & Jones "The Law of Restitution" 
D.W.M. Waters "The English Constructive 
• 
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Unjust Enrichnent. A Third Alternative? 
This third approach is the principle of unjust enrichment 
as found in the American law of Restitution. Nearly all of 
the major legal syste~s in the world have founct it necessary 
to provide, quite apart fron the fields of contractual and 
civil wrongs, for the restoration of benefits on the grounds 
of unjust enrichment. The principle of unjust enrich~ent 
presupposes three things 
(i) That the defendant has been enriched bv the receipt 
of a benefit 
(ii) That he has been enriched at the plaintiffs expense 
(iii) That it would be unjust to allow him to retain the 
benefit. 
It can be seen that restitutionary claims made under our 
presenr systen are based generally on this princi~le. But the 
trouble is said to be that the constructive trust in English 
law is viewed not as a remedy but as a part of substantive law. 
Hence the preoccupation ~ith trying to prove a fiduciarv relation-
ship, because once proven a constructive trust will automatically 
be imposed. 
Waters, in particular, argues that it woula be advantageous 
if the term constructive trustee were used to mean 
"(a) That every unjustly benefiting party is uncer an 
obligation to the deprived, and 
(b) That equity con?els him to discharge that obligation 
by the pavment of equivalent monetary value, or if 
preferable the restitution of the ivithheld sum, chattel, 
chose or land. 11 ( 36 ) 
(36) DWM Waters (supra) on p.1271 
18. 
The great advantage of this definition is that the courts could 
then concentrate on the equitable obligation of the defendant, 
rather than the approximate character of the remedy which is to 
be available to the plaintiff. Such reasoninq has received a 
deal of support. 
"In our view the courts should in the present context, 
abandon the requirement of a fiduciary relationship 
and recognise that equitable proprietary rights May be 
granted to prevent unjust enrichwent. Each case should 
be considered on its merits to decide whether the 
claiment should have the additional benefits which 
proprietary rights afford." (37) 
Another reason forwarded for instituting such a change 
is that it is illogical to place obligations on the constructive 
trustee which are the same as the fundamental obligations of the 
express trusts. The deterrent policy does not necessary apply 
when one is not dealing with express trustees. 
"For one thing there is a wirle range of fiduciaries, only 
some of whom could be expected to show or need show the 
trustees ultra-exclusion of self in any form." (38) 
Yet in the clamour for the abolition of this ~agical touch-
stone, "the fiduciary relationship'', the point is often over-
looked that in actual fact the aifference in practice between 
the effect of the two systems is not very substantial. This for 
the simple reason that the process of deciding whether there 
has been an unjust retention of a benefit necessarily involves 
the search for an obligation towards the deprived party, some 
form of tangible duty. In practice, the level of this "rluty" 
would seem to differ little if any from that inherent in the 
fiduciary relationship sought for in the English cases. 
(37) Goff & Jones (supra) on p.43 
(38) D~1 Waters (supra) on p.1253 
• 
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What the unjust enrichment principle does seem to involve, 
however, is a looser application of and adherence to the deterence 
factors. In Manufacturing Trust Co. v Becker (Jq) the directors 
of the co-operative had purchased company debentures at a discount 
price varying from 3 to 14 percent ; ©£ their face value. At the 
time of this purchase the co-operative was a going concern but 
the value of its assets was insufficient to cover its outstanding 
debts. It was found that the debentures were acquired without 
failure to disclose any material fact to the selling bond-holders, 
that the purchase was not unfair to the debtor company, and that 
the assistance rendered to the company by the res~ondents mater-
ially aided it in its grave financial siatuation. 
deterrence policy was recognised bv the court. 
Sorrte form of 
"equity must apply not only the doctrine of unjust 
enrich:nent when fiduciaries have vielded to the 
temptation of self interest, but also a standard of 
loyalty which will prevent a conflict of interest 
from arising." (40) 
In fact that a real possibility of a ·conflict of interests did 
exist. Yet he was prepared to balance against the potentiality 
of conflict the practical desirabilities of allowing the directors 
in that instance to bolster the failing economic position of the 
company, one decided that the batle policy should orevail. 
In a number of respects, then, the principle of unjust 
enrichment can be seen as offering improved methods of approach 
to the problem of a fiduciary profiting through his position bf 
trust. But as mentioned earlier. 
(39) 338 U.S. 304 
(40) ibid on 312 
Its use presents the courts 
20. 
with very much the same ty?e of problem as can be envisaged 
arising out of a burden of proof -test - a proble~ weighing 
and balancing interests and possibilities. With this in mind 
it is perhaps best of a coP1parison is made between this flexible 
test and the strict approach before passing final comment on 
the suitability of introducing such a sche~e into our legal 
system. 
The relative ITlerits of the "absolute" and "flexible" approaches. 
What does a comparison of thoese two approaches reveal? 
Can the interests of beneficiaries as a group be adeauately 
protected by the imposition of a stringent burden of proof test 
rather than an absolute rule, and if so would the decision in 
Boaromans case be reversed under such a test? 
The primary appeal of the flexible test idea is of course 
that it would eliminate the chance of an honest fiduciary being 
found guilty of a breach of trust. But advctates of the more 
relaxed approach also level severe criticism at the general 
effect of the absolute rule as it now stands. 
and 
"Boardman v Philips will not encourage men of Boardmans 
ability and energy to devote themselves whole-heartedly 
to trust administration." (41) 
"In this modern day and country when it is accepted as 
common place that substantially all business and cowmercial 
undertakings, regardless of size or importance, are carriecl. 
on through the corporate vehicle with the attendant corn-. 
plexities involved by interlocking and associated co=operatives, 
I do not consi<ler it enlightened to extend the ap?lication 
of those principles beyond their present liP1its ... care 
should be taken to in the light of modern practice and way 
of life." (42) 
(41) Gareth Jones (supra) on p.4R6 
(42) Peso case (supra) per Bull J. on P.lSJ 
• 
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These criticisms, with respect, cannot rationallv be seen 
to hold much weight. The situation must be put put in its 
true perspective. We are dealing here with quite a narrow 
field in the law of equity , those situations in which fiduciaries 
have made a profit by reason of their position. It must be 
remembered at all times that the present rule does not involve 
a total prohibition upon such activities. 
P.ny fiduciary is perfectly free to make such a 
profit, provided he does so with the full knowledge and 
approval of those persons to whom he owes the duty - trustee, 
beneficiary or who ever. So for instance if Boardman had 
bothered to get the assent of all the trustees then his action 
could not have arisen. And having regard to the nature of 
the position of fiduciary, a position of utmost trust, a 
nagging doubt exists as to just how any fiduciary can be held to 
be completely honest and bona fides if such assent is not 
gained. 
Any assertion then, that the dec.ision as it stands will 
discourage full devotion and energy on the part of fiduciaries 
is wholly misleading. Most fiduciaries are acting as such out 
of a sense of duty (many no douht spurred on by the fee they 
receive). Very few are looking for opportunities for. extra 
self-gain. But if by chance, such opportunity does arise, then, 
to repeat, so long as they have the informed consent of their 
principal, it may be utilise d. 
As to the second assertion, that the intracacie s and 
practicalities of modern business demand a relaxi ng of th e 
standards imposed, the suggested r e medy wou l d se em t o a ggreva t e 
rather than relieve the ~rob l e m. 
case o n its fac t s. 
• 
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"It seems to me that the complexities of modern 
business are a very good reason why the rule should be 
enforced strictly in order that such complexit i es 
may not be used as a smoke screen or a shield 
behind which fraud might be per?etuated .... In order 
that people may be assured of their protection against 
improper acts of trustees, it is necessary that 
their activities be circumscribed within rigid 
1 irni ted. " ( 4 3) 
With these supposed ~efects being unstantiatied, advocates 
of the burden of proof test are left basing their case on 
-i 
:i: 
0 
,c, 
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the fact that such a test will ensure that no honest • 
fiduciary will be found guilty of a breach of trust. A 
worthy result indeed, but achieved at what cost? 
One must evaluate the positive effects of the 
present approach, and the damage which its removal would 
cause. 
If in fact the policy behind the need for this rule 
was simply to prevent a profit ~ade unjustly, from being 
retained by the fiduciary, then there would be justification 
in allowing the fiduciary to prove his innocence ~y 
showing why he acted as he did, and the nature of the 
profit made. But this is not the case. The rule is also, 
in fact primarily, concerned with the protection of the ~an 
to whom the duty is owed. 
Those conseauences of any relaxation of the rule, which 
were so 'very obvious' to Lord Chancellor King in Keech v 
Sandford <
44 ) still exist today. The rule is strictly applied 
in order to deter fiduciaries from acts which mav be hoth 
difficult to dicover and hard to prove, as well as being in 
total opposition to the idea of the trust. 
(43) Peso case (supra) oer Morris J, 
(44) Supra 
cas e on its facts. 
< • 
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Also, the fiduciary is in a ?Osition of advantage which 
he could use unscrupulously. There is alwav s the chance of 
him being surveyed by interest rather than duty . Thus if 
directors could justify their conduct on the theory that their 
company was financially unable to undertake a venture, danger 
arises. 
"There will be a temp tation to refrain from exerting 
their strongest efforts on behalf of the company since 
if it does not meet the obligations, an opportunity of 
profit will be open to them." (45) 
The absolute rule then, removes temptation and ensures 
the conduct of fiduciaries, remains at a high level. It creates 
certainty within the law and removes the burde r of protracted 
litigation over difficult questions of evidence and de gree. 
It also guarantees that complete protection is affected to a 
person who's property is held on trust by another. 
"If a choice has to he nade between a rule which favo u rs 
the beneficiary who may well start with a real infornationa l 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the trustee, and a rule which 
permits a trustee to a-gue his way out of a prima-facie 
conflict situation where he night have avoided the whole 
difficulty by gaining an informed consent or court approval 
before he entered into the situationm that choice cannot 
be hard to make. " ( 4 6) 
Yet what of the Haldane v Haldane 
147 ) t y pe situation, 
where circumstances within the scope of a strict rule are exempted 
because they are not within its intent? The case of Canadi an 
Aero Services Ltd. v O'Malle y (
49 ) acknowledges that such situa 
tions can occur. Laskin J, whilst accep ting that a profit nay 
hav e to be disgorged, even though not gained at the expense o f 
( 4 5) Irv ing Trust Co. v Deut s ch 7 3 F 20. p .121 and 124 
(4 6 ) DWM Waters, (sup ra) p. 6 58 
L,A W LI BRARY 
( 4 7) Sup ra VICTORIA UNIV!!RSITY OF WELLINGTON 
(4 8) (1974)40 DLR 371. Th i s case reaf f i rme d t he us e o f t he absolut e 
rul e i n Canada . It d iscredited the Peso case , r a is ing strong 
doub t s as to whether t he j udg e s th erena d corr e ctly decid ed t he 
case on its fa c ts. 
• 
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the person owed a duty, was not however prepared to hold that 
"(either) the conflict test, referred to by Viscount Shanky, 
or the test of accountabilitv for profits acquired by 
reason onlv of being directors and in the course of 
execution of the office, reflected in the passage auoted 
fro~ Lord Russell of Killowen, should be considered as 
the exclusive touchstone of liability." (49) 
He continued 
"In this, as in other branches of the law, new fact 
situations may require a reformulation of the existing 
principle to maintain its vigour in the new setting." (50) 
Laskin J suggests then that the "absolute" rule is not 
absolute. Lord Greene's hypothetical would support this, as 
would the following statement of Lord Lohen. 
"in the present case had the company been a public co!'.lpany 
and had the appellants bought the shares on the market, 
they would not, I think, have been accountable." (51) 
The difficulty is that none of the judges indicates con-
ceptually what a fiduciary must show in order to avoid liability. 
Clearly to show that the principal has suffered no loss is not 
enough, policy demands more. This, I believe, is the weekness 
of the unjust enrichment principle as applied in the lT.S.A. It 
concentrates too heavily upon the particular parties in question, 
at the expense of the general policy considerations which are 
so much a part of the rule. For this reason I would be hesitant 
in advocating its use in its present form. 
In Boardmans case the court sought to discern whether or 
not there was a possibility of conflict. An examination of 
their Lordships judgenents, no doubt hindered bv the fact that 
some form of conflict, even if remote will be found in anv situation, 
shows the great difficulties involved in getting a clear inter-
(4Q) ~upra on n. ~73 
(50) Ibid 
(51) Boardmans v Phip?s (supra) on p.100 
--1 :c: 
0 
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pretation of such a phrase. This would suggest that any 
reformulation of the rule to cover the isolated exceptions 
that can exist should move away from tests involving degrees 
of conflict, which invariably lead to frustrating exercises 
in seman ties. 
Yet whatever the exact nature of the reformulation (the 
logical approach of the unjust enrichment approach holds a 
deal of appeal, if only a healthier regard could be instilled 
for the policies be~ind the rule) it is clear that it could 
not extend to cover the fact situation of Boardman v Phi?PS<
52 ). 
Even Lord Upjohn recognised that a conflict situation did exist 
in the case. 
"My Lord, I believe the only conflict between the duty and 
interest of the appellants that can be suggested is that having 
learnt so much about the Company, and realised that in the 
hands of someone like Tom the shares were a good buy at 
~ 3 a share, they should have co~municated this fact to the 
trustees, and suggested that they ought to consider a 
purchase and an application to the court for that purpose." (53 ) 
Now whether or not this is a real conflict, a sensible 
conflict, or even a real sensible conflict, it is clear that 
Boardman did not carry out his duty to inform the trustees to its 
fullest extent. I suggest that the intent of the rule, the policy 
requirements inherent in this area of the law necessar i ly require 
that even under a formulated rule, the decision of Boardman v 
Phipps (54 ) remains unaltered. 
The apparent harshness of these decisions then, which on 
closer examination is not so apparent, can only be averte d at a 
(52) Supra 
(53) ibid on p.131 
(54) ibid 
-1 
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0 
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cost for greater than the da~age, if any, caused through the 
occasional lack of faith in the present system. In this 
light Boardman v Phipps (55 ) must be seen as having been 
correctly decided. 
(55) supra 
-
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